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Providing sedation in end-of-life care involves lowering
or removing consciousness so that a patient no longer
experiences distressing symptoms, whose relief may be
judged impossible by other means. This practice is
known as sedation until death, palliative sedation, or ter-
minal sedation, and can be given intermittently or con-
tinuously until the patient’s death. In this paper we focus
on continuous sedation until death (hereinafter CS).
Several guidelines concerning the practice have been
published [1-5]. However, CS also remains subject to
considerable clinical, legal and ethical debate [6,7]. One
contested issue is the difference between CS and euthan-
asia. Some commentators argue that CS causes death
and often amounts to ‘slow euthanasia’ [8-10]. Others
argue that even if CS does not hasten death, it causes
patients to permanently lose the capacity to communi-
cate, and may thus amount to an imposition of social
death on the patient [11,12]. However, other commenta-
tors, as well as many guidelines [1-5], maintain that
there is a distinct difference between CS and euthanasia.
Distinguishing the two arguably is one of the main pur-
poses of the Dutch national guideline on sedation [5,12],
a guideline that has served as the basis on which other
sedation guidelines have built.
Furthermore, some relatives and health care profes-
sionals (here collectively referred to as care providers)
involved in CS experience moral and/or emotional dis-
tress. While some insight has been provided into the na-
ture of this distress [13-16], relatively little is known
about what may influence carers’ ability to cope with
such distress. In this paper we focus on the language
used by care providers when contemplating cases of CS
in which they have been involved.
This paper is based on the UNBIASED study (UK
Netherlands Belgium International Sedation Study), con-
ducted in the UK, Belgium and The Netherlands. The
specific research questions for this paper are:
1) How do physicians, nurses, and relatives report
dealing with the emotional impact of being involved
in continuous sedation until death?
2) How is this linked to their understanding of their
own moral responsibility?
These research questions will be answered by schema-
tising the data using a four point scheme in which we
will identify four types of ‘closeness’, by which we mean
the degree to which one feels connected with or respon-
sible for certain decisions or eventsa.
Although our study includes data from three different
countries, our research questions do not focus specific-
ally on national differences. For each quote used in this
paper we specify whether the respondent was Belgian,Dutch or British, but our focus is on the everyday moral
reasoning that was common to participants of the three
countries.
Methods
The protocol for this study has been published elsewhere
[17] and contains a detailed report of the methods used,
so only a summary is provided here. The UNBIASED
study is a qualitative study undertaken in the UK, The
Netherlands, and Belgium, involving interviews with
physicians, nurses, and relatives who had recently been
involved in the care for a sedated patient or loved one,
asking them about their experiences. The study was ap-
proved by the responsible Institutional Review Boards
(IRB’s) in all participating countries.
Interviews were conducted with 57 physicians (17 UK;
22 NL; 18 BE), 73 nurses (25UK; 28 NL; 20 BE), and 34
relatives (8 UK; 13 NL; 13 BE) who were involved in a
total of 84 cases of CS (22 UK; 35 NL; 27 BE). As some
physicians and nurses were interviewed about more than
one case and more than one relative was present for
some of the interviews with relatives, this makes for a
total of 82 interviews with physicians, 78 interviews with
nurses and 32 interviews with relatives. Interviews were
undertaken between January 2011 and May 2012. As we
were unable due to issue of confidentiality to access clin-
ical notes the physicians who had agreed to participate
in our study were asked to contact us if they had been
involved in caring for a patient older than 18 years of
age, diagnosed with cancer and to whom sedating medi-
cations had been administered continuously until death
with the aim of reducing difficult or refractory symp-
toms. Cases of both light and deep continuous sedation
were included (although the great majority of cases given
to us by physicians were cases of deep continuous sed-
ation). To avoid recall bias, physicians were interviewed
as soon as possible. Participating physicians were also
asked to identify the nurse most involved in each case
and they were subsequently invited to take part in the
study and, where they agreed, promptly interviewed. We
also asked the health care professionals interviewed to
identify the most involved relatives in each case who
were then invited to take part in an interview for the
study via the physician. Thus, ideally, for each single
case of continuous sedation at the end of life, an inter-
view was conducted with the physician, nurse and rela-
tive who were most involved in this case.
For maximum variety we included cases of deceased
patients who had received CS either while at home, in a
hospital setting (mostly oncology wards) or in a special-
ist palliative care setting (hospices for The Netherlands
and the UK, and palliative care units attached to hospi-
tals for Belgium). Care homes for the elderly were not
included as these services are organised very differently
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parison difficult.
Potential interviewees received an information sheet
about the study and were given the opportunity to ask
questions. Following this a consent sheet was signed and
participants were reminded that withdrawal from the
study was possible at any time. A short questionnaire
providing demographic information was also completed.
The interviews themselves were semi-structured, guided
by an aide-memoire containing general questions and
prompts (See Additional file 1 and Additional file 2).
The focus of each interview was the participants’ experi-
ences with, and perceptions of, their involvement in the
care of a patient who had received CS until death. Ques-
tions were also asked about participants’ general views
and attitudes towards continuous sedation until death.
Interviews were anonymised and transcribed verbatim.
The Dutch and Belgian interviews were translated into
English by professional translators. Important quotes
and passages were double-checked by the researchers
for language and interpretation. The data was analysed
thematically applying a constant comparative method
[18] using NVIVO™ to allow the results to emerge dir-
ectly from the data. Initially open coding involved text
segments being given a descriptive code, followed by the
development of a larger coding tree which combined
codes into larger themes or categories. Coding was done
by researcher KR and checked independently by SS and
CS. The combining of codes into larger categories re-
sulted in the four-point scheme reported in the results
section. Differences in coding or analysis were always
discussed and researchers were always able to reach con-
sensus. Finally, our findings were compared with others
and explored in relation to theories in ethics and
sociology.
This process from open coding to combining codes
into larger categories resulted in a four point scheme
which we report in this articleb. Though it of course
concerns a schematic way of organizing a complex data
set, we believe it captures the data. As we did not start
with a preconceived theory, the result is a new scheme,
although we will argue that it fits in well with other find-
ings in ethics and sociology.
Results
Many participants in our study discussed the personal
impact of being involved in CS until death. In explaining
what they thought influenced this impact we found that
many commonly referred to the degree of ‘closeness’
(our term) between their own actions and what hap-
pened [19]. ‘Closeness’ is an important moral feature, as
the degree of closeness one experiences can influence
one’s experience of moral distress or the degree to which
one feels morally responsible for certain actions orevents. Our analysis of the data revealed that closeness,
as it was reported by the respondents, had four dimen-
sions – decisional, causal, physical and emotional close-
ness – each of which will be discussed below. Besides
affecting the emotional impact of CS on respondents,
some dimensions helped respondents distinguish CS
from euthanasia. The distinction between CS and eu-
thanasia lies at the heart of moral dilemmas experienced
by some care providers and is a particular concern in
the Dutch national guideline [5,12].
Emotional and physical closeness
Respondents made it clear that being involved in con-
tinuously sedating a patient until death had great emo-
tional impact and that this was influenced by the degree
to which they felt emotionally and physically close to the
patient receiving CS.
Regarding emotional closeness, as may be expected,
relatives reported a high level of emotional involvement
and nurses reported being more emotionally involved
than physicians who were less immersed in the daily
care of patients. Emotional closeness was greatest when
participants developed a personal bond, or identified
with the patient. Conversely, emotional closeness was
resisted by, for example, stressing differences between
themselves and the patient. For example, a Dutch phys-
ician said:
Ah yes, Mrs. X, somebody about my age, I am a year
younger. It is very challenging to admit such a young
woman. She had a child of 16; my oldest is 16. I
identified myself greatly with her. But those are the
only similarities, because she was divorced, had a bad
marriage and was always dependent on her mother.
(Dutch physician on a palliative care ward, case 25)
Respondents could also be seen to reduce emotional
closeness by stressing the need to stay ‘professional’, as
several physicians and nurses put it. For example, a Bel-
gian nurse explained that, for her, caring for dying pa-
tients is particularly difficult:
Especially when they are also young, then it is
particularly difficult. We are only human after all…
But on the other hand, what I think doesn’t really
matter then. At that moment, you need to be
professional. It’s what he wants and not what I would
[want].
(Belgian nurse on oncology ward, case 18)
Or as explained by a Dutch physician:
Grief can be so palpable and feel like a blanket. To
enter such a room and think “ooh I have to wiggle
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sure I remain standing”, and just take two breaths.
(Dutch physician on a palliative care ward, case 25)
Physical closeness also influenced emotional impact,
something which mostly affected relatives and nurses
(who provided the majority of the physical care). Some
care providers found that being physically close to a se-
dated patient made it easier for them to cope when sed-
ation was successful in making the patient comfortable.
However, in cases where patients still seemed to be suf-
fering, being physically close to the patient could be dis-
tressing.c For example, a Dutch relative said regarding a
situation where physicians and nurses were unable to
get the patient calm:
Relative: He was… his body really stayed restless,
shocking… A fight, really fighting.
Interviewer: And how was it for you to be there?
Relative: Terrible…
(Dutch relative in hospice, case 23)
A relative of a UK patient described being highly dis-
tressed by watching her husband in his last days, sedated
but displaying symptoms such as excessive phlegm:
I mean the last couple of days, there was all this
gargling and everything going on, were pretty horrific,
you know. And I mean I was told that he was on so
much stuff that he wouldn’t have known about it,
although when they suctioned him out he’d still got,
like, a gagging reflex and everything. But that was
awful because I could do nothing for him … (weeping)
and that wasn’t nice to see him like that.
(UK relative in hospice, case L2)
Though not the same, emotional and physical close-
ness were sometimes seen as related, as being physically
close to a patient often resulted in feeling emotionally
close to that patient. For example, a Dutch nurse com-
mented on a case she had encountered earlier in her car-
eer where a baby was admitted to the hospice, and
reported being grateful she was not on duty then, be-
cause she knew that by being physically involved, she
would develop an emotional bond which would have
made the baby’s death difficult for her. She said:
I was very glad that I wasn’t involved in the care at
that moment, so that I couldn’t build a relationship.
(Dutch nurse in hospice, case 23)Decisional closeness
Deciding to use CS is a major decision as it involves re-
ducing a patient’s consciousness, often to a level at
which the patient is no longer able to communicate,
until death. Being closely involved in such a decision can
have a profound emotional impact and this also influ-
enced interviewees’ perceptions of their own moral
responsibility.
The interviewees most often described factors which
decreased decisional closeness. There was a major differ-
ence between physicians, nurses, and relatives in their
decisional authorityd. Nurses often reported not having
final responsibility for the decisions surrounding CS and
often saw their role as more ‘advisory’, reducing their de-
cisional closeness. A Dutch nurse, for example, de-
scribed being involved in the sedation process without
having final responsibility:
So the physician does take the decision [to start CS],
but we of course also watch how the patient is doing
and whether it is time [to start] or not.
(Dutch Nurse on oncology ward, case 9)
Relatives sometimes also experienced a lesser role in
decision making, as this UK relative reported:
Interviewer: were people talking to you about the
decision to increase the amount of sedation in the
syringe driver, and who, if anybody, did talk to you
about that?
Relative: Erm… I… I can’t actually put my finger on
that one. The only thing I can say is that [a particular
carer] was very, erm, keeping me informed and
everything else. Erm, I mean the decision really wasn’t
down to me, it was down to, down to the medical sort
of people…
(UK Relative, case L2)
While in these instances decisional authority rested
with the physician or the medical team, in other cases
respondents described the authority for the decision as
resting with the patient. In all three countries there were
examples of nurses and physicians stressing that the de-
cision to initiate or increase sedation was not in fact
theirs, but the patient’s. Thus, a Belgian nurse said re-
garding a decision to initiate CS:It is not my choice and that is… then you can cope
and then you are, ethically speaking, OK with it. (…)
And if you keep that in mind, I think …this may
sound very silly, but I want to compare it with [when]
someone in your ward wants to change sex, that you
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that or not, it’s the patient’s choice… And you must
show that you give them the best possible care because
that is your job as a professional.
(Belgian nurse on oncology ward, case 18)
A UK nurse commented in a similar vein when asked
how the use of CS made her feel:
Make me feel? That that’s what he wanted. I think, if
that’s what people want, then why not? Each to their
own, isn’t it?
(UK nurse in home care setting, case L2)
Decisional closeness for the individual was also re-
duced by depicting the decision as a team decision, so
that responsibility was shared. A statement by a UK
physician illustrated this, also showing that a ‘team’
might involve almost everyone involved in the case.
When asked whether shared decision-making made the
decision easier, the physician replied:
Yes…it’s always a collaborative decision-making in
some respect. The… final sort of, erm… responsibility
probably lies with me…but in fact the actual decision’s
been made with nursing input…and in fact the pa-
tients and staff and the relatives’ wishes as well.
(UK physician in home care setting, case GPROT1)
Decisional closeness was also reduced by emphasising
the fact that no other decision could have been taken,
thus reducing participants’ scope for exercising agency.
In these cases, the situation is conferred with a degree of
inevitability whereby, given a patient’s physiological state
and medical history, the only option was CS. Thus a
Dutch physician said:
I think there was no other option for this lady. She was
really…this was a lady who really suffered from the
situation and for whom we really did not have
another option besides this. So I think [sedation] was,
medically speaking, inevitable.
(Dutch physician on oncology ward, case O3)
Similarly, for those who were aware of the existence of
protocols or guidelines and used thesee, decisional close-
ness and therefore personal agency could be reduced by
stating one was only following guidelines (e.g. the Dutch
national guideline). For example, a UK physician talked
about drafting a guideline for sedation for treatment-
resistant agitation (one of the most common indications
for CS), to make care providers more comfortable:We are going to draw up some guidelines for people
with resistant agitation, so that when somebody is this
bad, we’ll feel more comfortable and we’ll say, ‘No, this
is what we need to do’ rather than (…) worry about
how you’re gonna do it.
(UK physician in hospice, case L74)Causal closeness
As mentioned above, decisional closeness refers to the
degree in which respondents felt ‘close’ to the decision
that was taken. However, interviewees also discussed
their perceived closeness to the causal chain of events in
administering sedative drugs (and thereby reducing or
taking away the patient’s consciousness) and in the even-
tual death of the patient. We refer to this as ‘causal
closeness’. Like decisional closeness, causal closeness af-
fected respondents’ perceptions of moral responsibility.
It is often recommended that physicians act in a way
that would increase their causal role in sedation over
that of nurses, for example by always being present
when sedation is started up, or by administering the
drugs themselves rather than asking nurses to do this
[5]. In practice however the difference between physi-
cians and nurses was sometimes minimal as many
nurses described being actively involved in administering
sedative drugs at various points in the process, includ-
ing, in some cases, initiation. Thus, whereas there were
differences between nurses and physicians with regard to
emotional and physical closeness, these differences were
less noticeable with regard to causal closeness.
However, there were circumstances where care pro-
viders experienced an uncomfortable sense of having
been too causally close. In such situations, they often felt
distressed, as illustrated, for example, by the experience
recounted by a Belgian nurse regarding a case where she
had to inject a patient with intravenous Midazolam:
Once I gave someone intravenous Midazolam, and I
thought, I’m injecting this person to death. And that
really isn’t a pleasant feeling. I felt like, I’m pushing
her under water, still, still, still, still, still, still, still,
still, still, still, and now you may come back up. That’s
the feeling I had and I don’t want to have it again.
(Belgian Nurse on palliative care ward, case P23)
An important way in which the sense of causal close-
ness was reduced was by adopting the notion that ad-
ministering CS allowed the natural disease process to
take its course. Describing CS in this way displaced
causal responsibility for the patient’s death from the
carer onto the natural order of events. A Belgian phys-
ician commented:
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the intention to make people die (…). The intention is
that we make them comfortable (…) and then let
nature run its course.
(Belgian physician on oncology ward, case O14)
Many respondents pointed out that intention was what
distinguished a death following CS from a death follow-
ing euthanasia. While euthanasia was reported as involv-
ing a deliberate action aimed at ending a patient’s life, in
CS potential life-shortening can be seen as a side-effect
and is thus less causally close. Examples were plentiful,
but one of the most interesting comments came from a
Dutch nurse, whose comments show how reducing her
sense of causal closeness had a major impact on her
own feelings about the procedure:
Interviewer: In your opinion, is there a very big
difference between palliative sedation and euthanasia?
Nurse: Yes… I think euthanasia is really clear… yes
you clearly inject somebody away. And yes just dead.
And with sedation you take away a person's
consciousness, but not that person’s life. Nature, or let
me put it this way, the natural process, can go on
despite the sedation…
Interviewer: And that makes a big difference for you?
Nurse: That makes a huge difference for me… We also
do euthanasia on the ward and I myself cannot take
part in it, because I would have a huge guilt feeling.
(Dutch nurse on oncology ward, case O33)
Another example is that of a Belgian nurse who de-
scribed the difference between euthanasia and CS:
What is euthanasia? That’s an injection, that’s
immediate, but sedation is then actually to let nature
run its course.
(Belgian nurse on palliative care ward, case P5)
The view that CS does not shorten life is also some-
thing that involved a reduction in causal closeness by
asserting that the respondents’ actions did not actively
contribute to a patient’s death. For example, when a
Dutch physician was asked whether she found it difficult
to intervene in the dying process, she replied:
Well … sedation of course is not a way to speed up the
dying process, it is something meant to lighten the
burden of life. And as far as that goes, I have no
problem with it. I myself have never experienced
euthanasia, but I personally would find that muchmore difficult because that is truly intervening to
shorten life. That would affect me a lot more [than
continuous sedation].
(Dutch physician on oncology ward, case 41)
Another element influencing causal closeness was the
time between the start of CS and the death of the pa-
tient. Once CS has been initiated the patient can stay
alive for several days (or even weeks), making it less
clear whether, and to what extent, the participants ac-
tions directly caused the patient’s death. Accordingly,
some participants reported distress in cases where pa-
tients died very shortly after having received CS, as the
following statement of a UK nurse demonstrates:
If I was to give, I don’t know, 20mgs midazolam it
might have been what he needed, and then he died
20 minutes later…what does that say to the family?
How do you justify that? In a Court of Law would that
be accepted? Do you see what I mean?
(UK nurse on oncology ward, case O2)
In a second example, a UK nurse talked about cases
where patients die shortly after the start of CS, which
she found difficult:
Especially when it’s so quick… because quite often you
think… that is dreadful, absolutely dreadful, when
they go soon after the injection.
(UK nurse in Hospice, case L3)
Stressing benefits over harms
As has been shown, many care providers described situ-
ations in which their decisional and emotional closeness
was lowered, and how this influenced the emotional im-
pact of their involvement and their perceptions of moral
responsibility.
However, closeness is just one factor that was felt to
influence the emotional impact of involvement in CS.
Respondents who experienced closeness did not always
say this was associated with emotional distress. Many
participants stated that the benefits outweighed the
harms of sedation. Employing this type of ‘balancing’
reasoning was another way for participants to cope with
their feelings of moral responsibility, particularly in cases
in which participants felt emotionally, physically, deci-
sionally, or causally close to the delivery of CS. Some-
times, if they were convinced that in a particular case
the benefits significantly outweighed the harm, respon-
dents would even assert that decisional and causal close-
ness was desirable as long as one is acting from motives
of compassion. A Belgian nurse, for example, stressed
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part in making a decision that contributed significantly
to reducing a patient’s suffering.
Nurse: I was able to contribute something so that he
no longer had to suffer. So at that moment you take…
you take part in an important medical decision that
can be of great help.
Interviewer: Yes, and that in turn helps you to deal
with it?
Nurse: Of course.
(Belgian nurse on oncology ward, case O18)
This nurse clearly felt the weight of this ‘important
medical decision’, but dealt with this heavy sense of re-
sponsibility, derived from her decisional closeness, by
stressing the overwhelming benefit to the patient.
The idea that, by providing CS, they were helping a
suffering person achieve the best experience of the end
of life that was possible was an important element in
dealing with moral and emotional distress. A Belgian
physician described having issues with CS, but being
able to cope with his involvement because he knew that
it was of great help in easing patients’ suffering, saying:
I can reconcile myself with that. I don’t lie awake
because I know that I am helping people with it, um,
but I continue to find it difficult.
(Belgian physician on oncology ward, case O14).
Some respondents expressed the fear that CS has a po-
tential to shorten life, and that therefore in using it, one
may be causally responsible for hastening a patient’s
death. Stressing the benefits of CS sometimes helped
care providers deal with this perceived causal closeness.
When asked whether she believed continuous sedation
shortened life in a certain case, a Dutch nurse answered:
That is a difficult one, very difficult. I do not know.
Yes maybe it was just the little push that this
gentleman needed, that is possible. But I granted him
that. And yes… yes… yes I have no problem with that,
then I have something like okay, why not? Why not
sedate someone then?
(Dutch nurse in hospice, case P24)Discussion
It is clear that many physicians, nurses and relatives
were emotionally affected by their involvement in CS.
The emotional impact of being involved in a case of CS
was highest when respondents felt physically andemotionally close to the sedated patient. This concurs
with available research [13-16]. The management of
emotions such as anger, fear, grief and distress in both
intimate and public contexts, including health care con-
texts, is a long established field for sociological research.
Notably, for example, Hochschild’s [20] concept of ‘emo-
tional labour’ (i.e. the deliberate regulation of one’s own
and one’s clients emotions as part of one’s job) [20] has
been applied in studies of the caring professions [21-23].
However, the emotional element of care work is not
solely confined to emotional labour. As a way of coping
with the emotions aroused by such significant actions as
providing CS, care providers may want to mitigate the
degree to which they feel morally responsible. Certain
factors can influence what we have called the closeness
of a carer to a particular decision or practice.
Regarding physical and causal closeness, care providers
mostly used language that appeared to reduce the close-
ness between themselves and the decision to use CS. In
this respect, our results match well with Bandura’s [19]
well known work in describing certain ways in which
people are able to disconnect their actions from events,
thereby reducing their sense of moral responsibility,
understood as the degree to which they feel they can be
blamed or praised for their role in those events [19].
Bandura [19] talks of ‘moral disengagement’ resulting
from such decreases in closeness to particular actions
[19]. This ‘moral disengagement’ is not necessarily rare
or sinister, but is rather a mechanism to help people
cope with difficult decisions in everyday life. The specific
mechanisms of ‘moral disengagement’ described by Ban-
dura include describing one’s actions in euphemistic
ways (as for example in saying that CS allows the
process of dying to occur naturally), by displacing re-
sponsibility (for example to the patient or the natural
order), and diffusing responsibility (for example, saying
that CS was a joint team decision, or the product of fol-
lowing guidelines). These ways of helping people cope
with their own feelings of moral responsibility, were all
evident in the interviews.
Thus in CS there are many ways in which care pro-
viders can influence their experience of emotional, deci-
sional, and causal closeness, perhaps then leaving more
‘wiggle room’ [9] for decision making. For many respon-
dents, this possibility of ‘wiggle room’ in CS seemed to
distinguish the practice from euthanasia where, at least
for the physician, certain dimensions of closeness are
much more difficult to deny or reduce (although some
who invoke a far-reaching concept of self-determination
by the patient would perhaps displace responsibility to
the patient entirely). Injecting a lethal dose of medica-
tion is clearly the cause of a patient’s death and, as
provided by the euthanasia laws in Belgium, The
Netherlands, and Luxembourg, the physician has final
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decisional and causal closeness as being emotionally and
morally difficult, the possibility of a more easily reduced
closeness in CS might be an attractive aspect of that
practice.
Unsurprisingly, as both Belgium and The Netherlands
have legalised euthanasia, there was more discussion of
this topic in the Belgian and Dutch interviews. The ac-
ceptance of shortening life as a way to relieve suffering
in some cases might partly explain why Belgian and
Dutch physicians, nurses, and relatives were seemingly
less troubled by the possibility of CS shortening life. UK
physicians and nurses on the other hand were more con-
cerned about this, as well as being concerned not to give
the impression, in the eyes of other caregivers or family
members, that CS had shortened life.
Distancing oneself as a way of coping with involve-
ment in a difficult practice might be perfectly under-
standable at times, and may sometimes even be
beneficial (e.g. when it results in truly shared decision-
making). However, reducing closeness may not always
be ethically desirable. For example, the view that death
following CS is natural, could be considered in several
respects to represent a distortion of the truth. Raus et al.
[24], who suggest five characteristics that are commonly
seen as key elements of a ‘natural’ death (− deep sleep,
fading away, internal causes, no prolonging or shorten-
ing of life, and no agency −) to the case of CS until
death, and who argue, in line with e.g. Seymour et al.
[25] and Billings and Block [8], that the resemblance be-
tween death following CS and a ‘natural’ death are
merely a mimicry or a simulation.
Furthermore, although shared decision-making is gen-
erally considered to be the best model for end-of-life
decision-making, it is questionable whether the displace-
ment or diffusion of responsibility is always desirable.
Sharing a decision can be done for the wrong reasons,
for example in order to not have to assume responsibil-
ity. Also, placing all responsibility on the patient might
be distressing for the patient (if they are aware of it)
while reducing the role of the carers to the role of ‘exec-
utors’ of the patient’s wishes.
This paper reports data from the UNBIASED study
which, a qualitative study conducted with the same
methodology in three different countries. Quantitative
studies have already shown that major differences exist
regarding the decision-making and performance of CS
in The Netherlands, Belgium and the UK [26,27]. This
study provides valuable insights into the commonalities
between physicians, nurses, and relatives from these
three countries in how they described describe and use
continuous sedation until death.
This study also has some limitations. For ethical rea-
sons cases were reported via physicians, creating apossible bias in the types of cases that were put forward
for inclusion in the study. This was countered by giving
physicians clear criteria and asking them to report every
case that fitted those criteria. Next, this study included
only adult cancer patients to guarantee a sufficiently
similar sample for Belgium, The Netherlands and the
UK, and may therefore not be generalizable to CS in pa-
tients suffering from diseases other than cancer. How-
ever, in response to general questions physicians did
discuss continuous sedation for patients suffering from
other diseases, and no major differences were reported.
Given its design, the authors do not see the findings as
being generalizable to all physicians, nurses and relatives
involved in CS in the three countries, however it is
hoped that the arguments resonate with the experience
of others and that the findings are transferable. More-
over, there were fewer hospital cases in the UK, whereas
in Belgium comparatively fewer cases came from a spe-
cialist palliative care setting. However, we have suc-
ceeded at including experiences of many different types
of sedation from the three settings (home care setting,
hospital setting, and specialist palliative care setting), to
obtain maximal variety in our sample. Finally, we did
not explore in detail the impact of country or clinical
setting on physicians’, nurses’, and relatives’ attitudes to-
wards CS at the end of life. Such comparisons will be
the subject of later papers arising from this project.
Our study also has implications for policy. Despite the
fact that many guidelines stress that CS is ‘normal med-
ical practice’, for many physicians, nurses, and relatives
the initiation of CS can be an emotionally distressing de-
cision. Policy-makers should be attentive to this, for ex-
ample by allowing physicians or nurses the chance to
discuss their distress afterwards or giving nurses the pos-
sibility to be less involved in some cases (i.e. when there
is a great risk of developing a strong personal tie with
the patient). Using our findings, a case can also be made
for more education for physicians and nurses centred on
decision making in relation to their perception of moral
responsibility, and, for example, for including relatives
with experience of the impact of CS in such educational
projects.
Conclusion
This paper provides a discussion of the emotional and
moral impact on caregivers of providing continuous sed-
ation until death. Our interviews have highlighted fac-
tors influencing emotional involvement as reported by
care providers. We have attempted to show how these
different factors can be understood as variations in
‘closeness’ in its different dimensions: emotional, phys-
ical, decisional and causal. Finally, we have argued that
our study shows how perceptions of these different di-
mensions of closeness play an important role in care
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ities. This gives an important insight into participants’
reasoning when involved in a far reaching practice such
as continuous sedation at the end of life.Endnotes
a ‘Proximity’ could be used as a synonym for ‘closeness’
in the sense used in this paper.
bNote that in reporting our results we omit absolute
numbers of how often and in how many different inter-
views a certain dimension of closeness was mentioned
or alluded to. The issue of whether or not one should
give numbers or percentages in qualitative research is a
topic of debate. We agree with Pope et al. [28] that
‘qualitative research does not seek to quantify data’ ([28]
p. 114), and we feel that the number of times a certain
dimension of closeness was mentioned is far from always
a good measure of the importance of that dimension.
For our method of analysis we have focused heavily on
the emphasis people put on dimensions of closeness
during the interviews and how this related to other parts
of their story rather than how many times an aspect of
closeness was mentioned.
cSee Bruinsma et al. [14] for a detailed account of rela-
tives’ experiences with continuous sedation.
d ‘Decisional authority’ in this context should not be
interpreted in a legalistic sense. It refers to the role
people played or perceived to have played in the
decision-making process regarding the sedation.
eAbarshi & Payne (Abarshi E, Payne S: Awareness of
the European Association for Palliative Care's (EAPC)
Recommended Framework for the Use of Sedation in
Palliative Care, forthcoming) conducted a study among
members of the European Association of Palliative Care
(EAPC) which showed that although many members
were aware of the existence of guidelines (the EAPC
guideline, a national guideline, or both), a significant
number of respondents was not aware of any guidelines.Additional files
Additional file 1: Aide memoire interviews with physicians and
nurses, questions (bold) and subsidiary prompts.
Additional file 2: Aide memoire interviews with informal care-givers,
questions (bold) and subsidiary prompts.
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